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Abstract 
This paper discussed the two cases of the regulatory decisions of the electricity sector regulator of 
Sri Lanka on renewable energy tariff calculation and approval of long term generation Expansion 
plan. The objectives of the analysis of the case studies are to examine how does utility can react on 
the regulatory decisions in the monopolistic market and whether it leads to a situation of Indirect 
Regulatory Capture. The regulatory process is examined from the perspective of various interest 
groups over the time, using Public Interest theory and Interest Group theory. The two cases are 
shown to have been strongly influenced by the interests of the different stakeholders of the 
electricity sector themselves, indicating a degree of 'regulatory capture'. The relationship of the 
utility and the regulator has been increasingly challenged by external pressures, interests of the 
stakeholders, and by, the level of resistance of the monopolistic utility.  The paper concludes that 
in the monopolistic electricity market regulators decision can be reversed if the Utility is strong 
enough to resist the regulators decision if not favorable for the public or the utilities’ interest. 
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1. Introduction 
Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) was established by the enactment of Act No. 35 of 2002. In 
2009 with the introduction of Sri Lanka Electricity Act No.20 of 2009, electricity sector was brought under the 
regulatory mechanism while giving PUCSL the regulatory mandate. One of the key aspect of the regulatory 
mechanism for the electricity sector is to protect the public interest in particular, with the contribution to a socially 
equitable and environmentally sustainable provision of electricity services (Byrne and Govindarajalu, 1997). In any 
regulatory regime, measures have been taken to protect the independence of the regulator in order to prevent 
regulatory capture. Independent regulatory agencies are important for good governance (Dubash, 2008). 
Regulatory good governance is important for the regulatory process if those are implemented practically (Cubbin 
and Stern, 2006). Schwartz (2007) emphasized that regulation is essential to protect physical health, safety, 
security, and ﬁnances and in order to deliver the public service to general public properly, efﬁciently, and 
effectively. In Sri Lankan context Utility in discussion, the Ceylon Electricity Board is responsible for part of the 
electricity generation, electricity transmission and 90% of the electricity distribution. The balance 10% of 
electricity distribution comes under the Lanka Electricity Company(LECO). There are few Independent Power 
Producers(IPP) including renewable energy projects coming under the Standard Power Purchase Agreements.  
Regulatory capture is where the regulator favors the interests of one group of stakeholders over those of other 
groups (Mullins, 1997) and it increases the vulnerability of the regulator (Carter and Morgan, 2017). According to 
Adams et al. (2007) regulatory capture has been noted as one of the risks in the regulatory process. If the 
regulatory capture is there that will cause damage to the concept of  regulation and violates the trust of the general 
public as well and other stakeholders on regulation. Phillips (1993) discussed that the regulator is usually subjected 
to improper external pressures. In sectors like electricity there are number of stakeholders, among those some of 
the stakeholders can apply improper pressures or influences towards regulator to achieve their desired objectives. 
The form of the influence varies and depends on particular group’s objectives and intentions. Citizens of the 
country expect the sector to perform according to the public policies. Hence the transparency, accountability and 
fairness are the pillars of the citizens’ expectations on regulatory process. Therefore, regulator has a huge 
responsibility to regulate monopolistic utility considering the interest of the public. According to Francis (1993 
Cited by Mullins (1997)) there are three theoretical general frameworks to explain the regulation as, public choice 
models, public interest and interest group theory. We use Public Interest theory and Interest Group theory to 
explain the PUCSL decisions on Calculation of Feed in Tariff (FIT) for renewable energy purchase and approval of 
Long-Term Generation Expansion plan of CEB. 
The most common form of regulatory capture occurs when a regulator make a decision based on perspective of 
one stakeholder. This is because that group is better informed, allowing it to be more influential in its arguments, 
and is in more frequent contact with the regulator, allowing it more opportunities to make its arguments. A 
particular group may also have more opportunities to meet up with the regulator informally, increasing its ability 
to influence them, or be able to offer employment and other opportunities to staff of the regulator. In that context 
regulation applies for the beneﬁt of the regulated entities as opposed to the public interest (Carpenter and Moss, 
2013). Engstrom (2012) has explained the types of regulatory capture specifically from a legal point of view as 
strong and weak capture. Accordingly, in the strong regulatory capture situation the interest‐group influence 
is so pervasive and impact has high social cost where unlike in weak capture. The influential party of the case on 
calculation of FIT would be renewable energy developers and in the case of Long-term Generation Expansion plan 
it is not very much clear who is/are the influential stakeholder(s). 
 
2. Objectives of the Study 
The first study objective is to explain two cases on Renewable energy purchasing tariff calculation and 
approval of Long Term Generation plan using Public Interest Theory and Interest Group Theory. The second 
objective is to understand the impacts of regulatory capture to determine if there is regulatory capture and what is 
the impact on the public interest and whether the Utility can protect the interest of public. Further this paper 
analyses the indirect regulatory capture of the utility in a monopolistic market where utility does not implement 
regulators decision if it is not favorable for the utility and their framework. 
 
3. Theories Used to Analyze the Cases  
3.1. Public Interest Theory 
Public interest theory emphasizes that under any regulatory mechanism the public interest has to be protected 
(Hantke-Domas, 2003). Hantke-Domas explains that the Chicago theory suggest that under any regulation that 
does not protect public interest and protect interest of interest groups (2003). Corry et al. (1994) discussed about 
the regulation and stakeholders’ interest and also the government should look after the interest of public in 
regulatory regime. Public Interest theory argues that regulation aims to benefit "the public interest" (Crew and 
Rowley, 1988). If the regulator makes balance decision the public will get the benefits. 
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Figure-3.1. Balanced Regulatory decision 
 
3.2. Interest Group Theory 
Elhauge (1991) argues that all the participants in a process act to their self-interest. All the stakeholders 
involving with the process try to look after their interests in the process rather than the interest of general public. 
Any stakeholder group seek to maximize their own well-being at the process. In regulatory process groups who 
involve with the process try to maximize their benefits. Elhauge (1991) further discussed about the less focuses on 
public interest during the regulatory process as stakeholders do not look after the public interest. According to 
Francis (1993 cited Mullins (1997)) regulation is an exercise among groups and between groups and the state and 
such groups help to create regulatory initiatives and create regulatory outcome. In the electricity regulatory 
mechanism, there are lot of stakeholders such as employees of the utility, some of the independent power producers, 
government, regulatory employees. It is clear that such stakeholders can provide inputs which are favorable to 
regulatory process, where they can look after own interest of the group or individual. Macey (1986) explained that 
due to the interest group theory the major implication is legislation transfers of wealth from society to those 
discrete, well-organized groups that reduce societal wealth and economic efficiency in order to benefit these 
economic groups. 
 
 
Figure-3.2. Bias regulatory Decision/Regulatory Capture 
 
4. Methodology 
Data for two case study was based on review of documents available with the regulator (PUCSL), Utility(CEB) 
and the Ministry of Power & Renewable Energy of Sri Lanka(MOPRE). Secondary sources of documents included, 
the research literature on various elements of the regulatory Capture, the policy and legislative response of 
government, as evidenced in government and institutional (PUCSL & CEB) documentation and the policy and 
decisions observable from the public records of PUCSL. These documents were analyzed with respect to the FIT 
calculation and approval of Long Term Generation Expansion plan and the main points of which are summarized 
below under each case. 
 
5. Analysis of the Cases 
5.1. Tariff Setting for Renewable Energy Purchasing from Independent Power Producers Under the Standardized 
Power Purchase Agreements 
Tariff setting is an important aspect of power purchasing regulation. As per the section 9 of Sri Lanka 
Electricity Act No.20 of 2009 power purchase has to be done through competitive process. However, that process 
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was different for renewable energy generation especially generation less than 10 MW of projects. Ceylon 
Electricity Board (CEB) uses Technology Specific Cost based tariff for renewable energy electricity purchasing as 
the FIT. According to Lesser and Su (2008) FIT has features of Agreed amount of price, agreed period of 
purchasing of electricity. In the FIT methodology different renewable technologies have different purchasing tariff 
as FIT. The FIT has two types one is three tier tariff and levalized tariff. Under the three-tier tariff methodology 
there are different tariffs when years passed and in different periods of years. In levalized tariff option developers 
gets same tariff throughout the period of power purchasing agreement and tariff would equate the net present 
value of revenue from the plant's output with the net present value of the cost of production (Borenstein, 2012). 
In the regulatory regime, regulatory mechanisms are different from country to country and it is not similar 
everywhere. It means that, due to the empirical specifics of regulatory spaces, including national legal traditions, 
organizational actors, and specific procedures has to be considered (Dubash, 2008). Thus, the FIT for renewable 
energy practiced during the period of 2007 up to now can be understood in that context. The tariff had been 
reviewed when and necessary and the issue had been arisen with the calculation of the tariff 2012. The parameters 
considered for the tariff calculation are annual plant factor, Capital Cost, Operation and maintenance cost, Fuel 
cost, debt equity ratio, annual Return on equity, Interest rates so and so forth. With the approval of Board of 
Directors of CEB, CEB submitted calculated FIT to the PUCSL. After reviewing of CEB FIT proposal, PUCSL 
approved different high tariff than CEB proposed tariff and published it. We used levalized cost option and the 
comparison is as follows.  
 
Table-5.1. Comparison of Tariff proposed by PUCSL and CEB 
Technology CEB proposal 
(Tariff in LKR) 
PUCSL proposal  
(Tariff in LKR) 
Difference(LKR) % 
Mini Hydro         13.63 16.70 3.07 22.5 
Mini Hydro Local         13.95 17.15 3.2 22.9 
Wind         17.40 20.62 3.22 18.5 
Wind Local                                        17.86 21.22 3.36 19.3 
Biomass Dendro          23.56 25.09 1.53  6.5 
Biomass (Agricultural& Industrial waste)          16.21 17.71 1.5 9.25 
Municipal Solid Waste           No tariff 26.10 - - 
Waste Heat Recovery           7.77 9.19 1.42 18.3 
Other Technology           23.56 25.09 1.53 6.5 
        Source: Ceylon Electricity Board data and Public Utilities Commission reports  
 
The calculation was done based on the parameters and the tariff calculation formula. The reasons behind the 
difference and the comparison of the parameter figures given in below. 
 
Table-5.2. Capital costs of Renewable Energy projects 
Technology CEB (LKR 
Mn.) 
PUCSL 
(LKR Mn.) 
Reasons 
Mini Hydro 209 220 Rupee devaluation and inflation when calculating the 
capital cost, Renewable Energy developer’s associations 
requested it.  
Mini Hydro Local 214 221  
Wind 223 243 Wind Power association requested LKR254Mn 
Wind Local 229 250  
Biomass Dendro 243 263 Bio Energy Association of Sri Lanka commented that 
Value Added Tax (VAT) on materials has to be taken 
into account when calculating capital cost of projects.  
Biomass (Agricultural & 
Industrial waste ) 
243 263 Bio Energy Association of Sri Lanka commented that 
Value Added Tax (VAT)a on materials has to be taken 
into account when calculating capital cost of projects.  
Waste heat Recovery 211 229  
    
   Source: CEB tariff reports 
 
a. At that time taxes were exempted for renewable energy projects which signed power purchase Agreements 
with CEB. 
The decision of the PUCSL is given in the report on Renewable Energy Tariff calculation 2012 and it was 
decided that CEB capital cost figures are reasonable and acceptable. Further PUCSL has considered that the 
proposal of CEB contained a 3% depreciation of LKR against the US Dollar compared to December 2011 
(113.90LKR/ 1USD), for Machinery & Equipment component of the capital cost estimates. PUCSL has adjusted 
the capital cost figures while considering the stakeholders’ comments and sharp depreciation of the LKR in 
February 2012, the machinery and equipment component of the capital costs were adjusted to reflect the exchange 
rate variations up to July 2012 (PUCSL 2012). 
The interest rate of the debt financing is an important parameter of the tariff calculation. CEB has calculated 
FIT based on the interest rate Average Weighted Lending Rate(AWLR) during the tariff calculation and it had 
been clarified from Lending Agencies on interest rate for this nature of business. Even in the PUCSL stake holders 
meeting it was highlighted by the Banks the applicable interest rate for this nature of business is Average 
Weighted Prime Lending Rate +3%(AWPLR+3%).But PUCSL has decided to consider Average Weighted 
Lending Rate (AWLR) +3% to calculate the approved rate of the tariff (PUCSL2012). PUCSL has considered 
additional 3% risk premium on top of the AWLR where the market risk already included in AWLR as per the 
banks. Discount rate or the weighted average cost of the capital had been considered by the PUCSL as 15.37 where 
as CEB figure is 16.37 at Debt: equity ratio 60:40. Return on Equity also important parameter and PUCSL stand 
on the CEB figures proposed as 22% ROE for 1-15 years and 20 % for 16-20 years. 
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The plant factors used by CEB and PUCSL are as follows. 
 
Table-5.3. Comparison of plant factors 
Technology CEB value PUCSL value Reasons 
Mini Hydro 42% 39%* *PUCSL considered the submissions of stakeholders 
and the actual historical data collected by the 
Commission; the average plant factor of mini hydro 
plants during last 15 years was 39%. Considering the 
above, average plant factor of 39% was approved for 
Mini-hydro technology. 
Mini Hydro Local 42% 39% *  
Wind 32% 32%                             
Wind Local 32% 32%  
Biomass Dendro 80 80%  
Biomass 
(Agricultural & 
Industrial waste) 
80 80%     No Change 
Waste heat 67% 67%  
          Source: CEB and PUCSL 
 
The issue with previous plant factors is those power plants were developed by the investors under a different 
tariff method and in that development they could consider optimum size of the machines turbines in their financial 
method. If it considers for future plants that is not reasonable as these plants are site specific and new investors can 
consider 42% plant factor in their designs and financial models to achieve such plant factor forced by the FIT 
mechanism during design stage of the project.  
The Operation and Maintenance cost proposed by the CEB accepted by the PUCSL without considering the 
other stakeholders’ comments. 
 
5.2. Key Interests and Influences on Renewable Energy Tariff Setting Regulations 
In a regulatory regime there would be a dominant group(corporatism) which can influence the regulator for 
decision and also there may be several interested groups(pluralism) may influence for its decision and it indicates 
the level of influence by the shape of the decision (Mullins, 1997). Therefore, in any regulatory decision could be 
influenced by the interested groups and their capability indicates at what extend that they can influence to change 
the decisions of the regulator. In the tariff calculation methodology, it can be identified several groups. From utility 
side CEB Management and trade unions can be identified as two influential groups. Further the Associations 
established based on the specific technology such as Small Hydro Power Association, Wind Power Generators 
Association, Bio Energy Association can be identified as influential groups. During the 2012 FIT calculation they 
had submitted their proposals and try to get favorable tariff for them. However, in tariff calculation method it is 
necessary to consider the all the costs incur with renewable Energy. This was explained by Thatcher (2002) that 
assurance of the repayment of private investment is essential to recover expenditure and sufficient profits.  
On the other hand, if the PUCSL did not approve good and attractive tariff that will effect on GOSL Policies 
on Renewable Energy Generation, at that time the target was 10% from Non-Conventional Renewable energy by 
year 2015 (National Energy Policy, GOSL 2008). So determination of the tariff has huge impact on achievement of 
policy targets. If the FIT offered is not favorable for the investors they will not invest. On the other hand, most of 
the Countries facilitate renewable energy development to reduce the dependence on fossil fuel. GOSL wants to 
enhance the contribution of renewable energy in electricity generation. In Sri Lanka general public wants to have 
reliable cost effective electricity for their consumption. If the regulatory decision incurs additional or unreasonable 
cost that would be a burden for the electricity customers. Therefore, as per the public interest theory in any 
regulatory process it has to be protected the general customers interest rather than other interest groups 
requirement. The basic principles of the policy are to reduce the imports of petroleum products and also protection 
of environment or minimize Green House Gas (GHG) emissions. This government policy on renewable energy 
generation and meet the policy targets are important aspects of future renewable energy generation and PUCSL 
has to consider these areas in the process of approving tariff approval. If the confidence of the investors loses about 
the confidence of the market which can be damaged to the corporate economy of the sector (Vithiatharan and 
Gomez, 2014). The attractive tariff for renewable energy is one of the success factor for capacity addition of 
renewable energy to the system.  
However, with the announcement of PUCSL on new renewable energy FIT, CEB had objected the proposed 
tariff and refrained from implementing it. This was account for the interest of CEB to reduce their generation cost 
and thereby to recover the cost through the prevailing tariff system since the existing tariff is not sufficient enough 
to meet the cost. So CEB was not willing to pay higher tariffs for electricity purchasing. Then debate was started 
between CEB and PUCSL and PUCSL issued enforcement order under the provision of Sri Lanka Electricity Act 
enforcing CEB to implement it. Since PUCSL had approved the different FIT, they were not agreed to change the 
tariff as they want to maintain their stance. Then CEB filled a case against PUCSL. However, GOSL interfere in to 
the matter to resolve the issue amicably. As a result of GOSL interference, again a high official committee was 
established and they decided a new tariff for the renewable energy purchase. Further the matter was referred to the 
Attorney General to get legal opinion. The Attorney General informed that the PUCSL has no mandate to 
determine renewable energy tariff and utility has to follow the competitive bidding process for renewable energy 
development. This was really a shock for renewable energy developers and the development of renewable energy 
projects hampered as a result of it. The development of renewable energy projects in each year capacity in MW 
after introduction of Technology Specific Cost Based Tariff is as follows. Under this discussion the technologies of 
Hydro, Wind, Biomass, Solar considered as the impacts of tariff of such technologies are affected. 
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Table-5.5. Capacity addition of Renewable Energy 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2103 2104 2015 2016 2017 
Technology 
Mini Hydro 33.6 23.35   3.7 22.25 31.07 37.4 25.79 15.4 28.11 16.62 
Wind   0   0 30.85 10.0 32.8   4.8 40.0 10.0   0   0 
Solar      1.36   0   0   0   0 20 30 
Biomass 10.0   0   0    0.5   0   0.5   7.0   0.12   0.50   4.0 
     Source: Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority, (2018) 
 
This can be illustrated by following graph.  
 
 
Figure-5.1. Capacity Addition of Renewable Energy during last 10years 
          Source: Ceylon Electricity board 
 
It is very clear that the capacity addition of renewable energy reduced after the year 2014. This is the issue 
relevant with the tariff determination of the PUCSL and pressure exerted by CEB on implementation the declared 
FIT by the PUCSL. Due to this conflict the attorney General’s opinion was to go for tenders for implementation of 
renewable energy projects. Tendering process had been implemented especially for wind and Solar projects but no 
single utility scale project implemented yet though the purchasing price had been reduced due to the competition.  
The summary of renewable Energy power generation projects which have signed SPPs for the feed in Tariff 
published on 2014 and effective from 01.01.2012 are as follows. 
 
Table-5.6. Renewable Energy capacity addition after 2014 
Project Type 
Commissioned SPPA Signed Grand Total 
Number of 
Projects 
Capacity (MW) 
Number of 
Projects 
Capacity(M
W) 
Number of 
Projects 
Capacity(MW) 
Mini Hydro 37 57.08 55 104.80 92 161.88 
Dendro 03 6.02 05 16.74 8 22.76 
Agro & 
Industrial Waste 
01 0.08 01 2.50 2 2.58 
Solar 05 50.00 02 20.00 7 70.00 
Municipal Solid 
Waste 
0 0 01 10.00 1 10.00 
Total 46 113.18 64 154.04 110 267.22 
  Source: Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority 
 
The calculated annual generations of renewable energy electricity in the years based on the plant factors 
considered for tariff calculation, are as follows. 
 
Table-5.7. Cash flow issue on implementation of CEB and PUCSL 
Technology Electricity generation    
( kWh)*/Annum 
Difference between CEB 
proposed tariff and PUCSL 
tariff (LKR) 
If CEB implemented PUCSL 
approved tariff additional cost 
could be bared (LKR)/Annum 
Mini Hydro 210,008,736 3.07 644,726,819.00 
Wind 0   
Biomass 64,333,440 1.53 64,333,440.00 
Agriculture waste 560,640 1.5 840,960.00 
Solar 29,000,000 1.5 43,800,000.00 
    
 *Considered only the power purchased under new tariff and assume that such power plants connected to the grid and generate electricity based on 
the plant factor considered during the tariff calculation. 
 
Therefore, according to the above table it is clear that the additional cost could be borne by CEB for the above 
electricity purchasing per annum is approximately LKR 753,701,219 if they implement the PUCSL approved FIT. 
Normally power purchased agreements signs for 20 years period total cost would be approximately 20 times of 
such annual cost. This amount is an additional cost if CEB implemented PUCSL decision on FIT. This had to be 
passed to the customers by implementing either tariff increase or providing subsidiary from the Treasury to CEB.  
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5.2.1. Environmental Aspects 
As per the legal opinion of Attorney General, CEB has not issued Letter of Intents(LOI) and has not signed 
power purchased agreements with any new renewable energy projects unless that project has valid permit before 
the enactment of the Sri Lanka Electricity(Amendment) Act. Due to this reason considerable amount of renewable 
energy projects have been standstill without being implemented. Since those renewable energy projects get delayed 
comparatively environmental friendly projects are not being implemented. There is substantial amount of new 
projects to be implemented due to these issues investors are facing difficulties.       
 
5.2.2. Utilities Expenditures 
In electricity market ensuring electricity prices reﬂect the economic cost of supply is a political challenge 
(Dornan, 2014). In Sri Lankan context it is difficult task to ensure the economic cost of electricity generation 
through the tariff mechanism as any increase of the electricity tariff would burgeon lot of issues in the society. That 
would cause difficulties to political leaderships and hence they will think twice to increase tariff to meet economic 
cost of the CEB for electricity generation. According to the CEB financial report 2017, CEB is recovering only 
LKR 16.00/kWh where the real economic cost is LKR 20.03/kWh, (CEB, 2017). It is clear, that CEB is not 
recovering the cost of the electricity supply through the electricity tariff. PUCSL has considered the grievance or 
the requests of renewable energy developers rather than the public interests. Operational efficiency is very 
important for any business and deliver the service in cost effective manner (Simintiras et al., 2015). In electricity 
sector operational efficiency is very important, even in electricity purchasing has to be done through cost effective 
manner. According to Elhauge (1991) some of the activities or results of the systems are not favorable for interests 
of the general public, hence it emphasizes that even in the regulatory system there would be some decisions of the 
regulator unfavorable for interest of general public. However, in a monopolistic market, utility has ability to stand 
against the regulators decision and put pressure to change regulators decision. This is also an another facet of 
regulatory capture. In fact, the change of the decision of regulator is not due to the influence it is because of the 
pressure of resistance from the strong utility. This can be defined as Monopolistic Utility Standing theory where 
utility can defend certain extend interest of the organization.   
 
5.3. Approval of Least Cost Long Term Generation Expansion Plan 
As per the Sri Lanka Electricity(amendment) Act 31 of 2013, CEB is supposed to prepare Least Cost Long 
Term Generation Expansion Plan(LCLTGEP) to meet demand growth for electricity. LCLTGEP is prepared for 
20 years’ period and it reviews after two years’ period. The study is covered the approval process of LCLTGEP for 
the period of 2018-2037 period. Under the preparation of LCLTGEP, PUCSL agrees with CEB about the input 
parameters of the preparation of LCLTGEP. These parameters published for stakeholders’ comments basically 
those input parameters are Reliability Criteria, Cost of Unserved Energy, Discount Rate, Consideration of Social 
Damage Cost, Electricity Demand Forecast, proposed candidate energy supply technologies, their costs and 
efficiency parameters, Fuel prices, Renewable technologies and their cost parameters and Scenarios selected for 
analysis and after finalization of it the parameters were given to CEB to follow for preparation of LCLTGEP. The 
parameters considered to prepare LCLTGEP are as follows as per the document of Regulatory Manual (2014) on 
input parameters for the Long Term Generation Expansion Plan 2018-2037.The input parameters and 
assumptions considered as the most important facts and the basis in the preparation of the LCLTGEP. 
Reference date for the costs is 01.01.2017, exchange rate is LKR 148.88/1 USD and discount rate is 10% are 
the economic parameters agreed upon. There were several sensitivity studies and scenario analysis conduct to 
prepare the LCLTGEP such as Demand Forecast (High/Low), Discount Rate(High/Low), Fuel price fluctuations, 
Fuel Diversification Options, Energy mix with the introduction of Nuclear power, scenario with India Sri Lanka 
HVDC interconnection. 
With the agreed parameters CEB had done the Sensitivity studies and prepared the CEB proposed 
LCLTGEP2018-2037 and submitted it to the PUCSL. CEB uses mainly the Wien Automatic System Planning 
(WASP IV) software to derive the generation plan. In the formula it was considered about the cost parameters to 
calculate the total cost of the plan. Based on the cost of the plan CEB has finalized the based case scenario of the 
next 20 years’.  The CEB LCLTGEP base case scenario is basically based of the generation mix including Coal, 
Renewable, Natural Gas option etc.  
As per the provisions in the Public Utilities Commission Act No. 32 of 2002 PUCSL invited public comments 
from stakeholders. Several parties submitted comments and made oral presentations in the process. However, after 
the public consultation process PUCSL gives the approval for PUCSL reviewed LCLTGEP 2018-2037 which is 
mainly comprising Natural gas, renewable energy sources. The summary of the points highlighted by individuals 
and groups submitted to PUCSL on long-term generation expansion plan is as follows. 
According to above summary it can be observed that PUCSL received comments from stakeholders on change 
of parameters and on change of input parameters. After consideration of comments of stakeholders, the PUCSL has 
approved the LCLTGEP and sent to the CEB as a decision document. However, CEB did not agree to implement 
the decision document of LCLTGEP received from the PUCSL and they emphasized the disagreement with the 
PUCSL decision. 
Differences of the planning code parameters between CEB base case scenario and PUCSL revised case scenario 
are as follows. 
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Table-5.8. Analysis on comments of Public hearings 
     Source: PUCSL decision on LCLTGEP 2018-2037 
 
 
Table-5.9. Comparison of parameters 
Parameter CEB LCLTGEP 2018-2037 PUCSL LCLTGEP 2018-2037 
Loss of Load Probability 0.2 0.5-1.5% 
Reserve Margin Above 2.5% and below 20% Upper limit Above 10% and below 35% 
Cost of Energy not Served  0.663USD/kWh 0.5 USD/kWh  
Source :PUCSL and CEB   
     Source: CEB and PUCSL 
 
In both plans CEB and PUCSL have highlighted the loop falls against each other. The Summary is as follows. 
 
Comment No. of 
submission  
Whether it is on input 
parameter or not 
Percentage % 
Adequacy of Share of Renewable Energy 
considered  
17 No            47.2 
Consideration of externalities 9 Yes            25.0 
Impact of LKR depreciation on Cost of renewable 
based generation  
6 Yes            16.7 
Suitability of WASP to analyze new renewable 
technologies 
4 No            11.1 
Generation Planning Code in the Grid Code is no 
longer appropriate in preparing the Long-Term 
Generation Expansion Plan 
4 No                                                     11.1 
Problems in fuel prices used for the preparation of 
the draft plan 
2 Yes                                           5.6 
Emphasis of Coal as the cheapest generation option  3 No              8.3 
Cancellation of Sampur Coal plant and cost 1 No              2.8 
The plan underestimates the expected cost 
reductions in renewable technology 
3 No              8.3 
Consideration of technological advances in 
renewable technologies in the plan -smart 
networks, -battery storage systems -vehicle 
charging -smart grids to mitigate stability issues  
7 No            19.4 
Plan has not considered Demand Side Management 
(DSM) initiatives of the government 
6 No            16.7 
Consideration of availability of Domestic Natural 
Gas in the plan 
3 Yes              8.3 
Compensation of additional cost for capacity 
addition of high cost renewables  
2 No              5.6 
Solar plants generate energy only in day hours and 
this will cause even more sharp night peak. 
1 No              2.7 
Even though border prices are used for the 
preparation of the plan, actual dispatch is 
conducted based on market prices of the fuel 
2 Yes              5.6 
Consideration of Transmission cost  2 Yes              5.6 
Pessimistic Network losses forecast 2 Yes              5.6 
Social issues with nuclear power plants in Sri 
Lanka  
3 No              8.3 
Milestones to be achieved to develop Nuclear 
power 
2 No              5.6 
Basis for having 5% amount of extra spinning 
capacity per MW of ORE,  
2 Yes              5.6 
Environmental impacts of renewable energy 
projects  
2 No              5.6 
Rights to curtail Variable Renewable Energy  2 No              5.6 
Coal plants should not be considered, when Paris 
Agreement specifically, noted that Sri Lanka 
cancelled plans to build 4700 MW of coal-fired 
power generation. 
2 Yes                                       5.6 
Timely implementation of power plants should be 
ensured 
3 No          8.3 
Coal Jetty, harbor and fuel transport cost should be 
considered in the plan. 
2 Yes          5.6 
Slow implementation of government initiatives on 
solar roof top capacity additions  
5 No         13.9 
Need to consider the scarcity of land for power 
plants 
1 No           2.7 
Requirement for proper disposal mechanisms and 
destinations for thrown out solar panels will have 
to be planned now.  
1 No           2.7 
Consideration procurement of electricity through 
interconnections 
1 No           2.7 
Require identification of Policy Cost 1 No           2.7 
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Table-5.9. Comparison of PUCSL figures and CEB 
Item PUCSL comments CEB comments 
Demand Forecast load factor improvement resulting off-peak 
demand increase is unrealistic 
Considered past demand growth rate and also 
planned large scale development  
Economic Costs  CEB has taken an effort to include border 
prices in to the planning process. CEB has not 
considered environmental externalities, local 
employment and other economic benefits of 
some technologies.  
CEB has considered all the factors in the 
assessment, except environment externality 
cost. 
 
Externality cost PUCSL accepted the fact that there is no 
specific data available for local context. But  
1.2 US Cents/kWh difference in externality 
costs is sufficient to tilt a coal dominant 
generation plan to a NG dominated plan, and 
all the recent studies reveal higher gaps in 
externality costs (between coal and NG) 
CEB is in the view that best externality cost 
should be determined considering Sri Lankan 
context before incorporate to the Long Term 
plan. 
Fuel Cost Current prices are substantially different 
appears to misrepresent the actual pricing at 
the time of preparation of the plan using Long 
term (2015 and 2016) average, . 
CEB has considered the 2-year average fuel 
prices and had conducted sensitivity analysis.  
Candidate Plant Size, 
Technologies and 
Scenarios  
Forced conditions of the revised case: 
300MW Coal Plants (Sub Critical) were not 
considered for the optimization due to low 
efficiency and high emissions ,600MW Super 
Critical Coal Plant option was allowed from 
2025 onwards considering a feasible 
timeframe for implementation and Pump 
Storage Plant option was forced.  
Forced conditions imposed additional 
constraints to deviate away from least cost 
candidate options and it violates the least cost 
planning principles. 
Energy Security Sri Lanka has built one coal power station and 
relies on it to supply about 40% of the current 
demand. Also Natural Gas deposits have been 
discovered in the North- Western sea area of 
the country and any development of that 
resource would depend heavily on the 
prospective demand from the power sector.  
CEB base case has considered a mix of 
Natural gas and coal based thermal plants 
which ensure energy security and robustness 
in fuel price fluctuations 
     Sources: PUCSL revised LCLTGEP 2018-2037 Comments of CEB on the PUCSL decision on LCLTGEP 2018-2037 
 
The above summarized differences among others highly criticized by CEB as the argument of preparation of 
LCLTGEP has to be done by the Utility not by the Regulator. However due to this conflict implementation of 
identified generation projects got delayed and hampered as CEB has refused to implement the LCLTGEP approved 
by the PUCSL. 
 
6. Discussion 
In the renewable energy tariff calculation process, it was not clearly manifested by regulator on no regulatory 
capture and it is responsibility of regulator to show there is no any regulatory capture or prevent such initiatives if 
any while introducing a robust mechanism. The decisions made or to be made by regulator delineates the level of 
capture of utility. But in the FIT calculation process the PUCSL considers the high interest rate and low plant 
factor considering the submissions of the renewable energy developers. The influence might cause to consider such 
favorable factors for renewable energy developers to come up with high tariff. There is no evidence that PUCSL 
has directed CEB to go for tendering process to select renewable energy developers in order to reduce the cost of 
the generation where public has interest to reduce the cost of the electricity generation and capacity addition of 
green energy to the system. The interesting point is CEB has not implemented the PUCSL decision on FIT of 
renewable energy and CEB rejected to implement it. Due to that PUCSL was not in a position to take any action 
against CEB.  
 In the process of preparation of LCLTGEP regulator revised the plan even using some of the parameter 
figures which were not agreed upon with the utility. That causes the different output from the revision and the 
PUCSL decision was drastically different from the CEB proposal. That causes origination of debate between CEB 
and PUCSL. Due to that controversy CEB had not implemented power generation projects. The delay time is more 
than one year and two months. This may cause power shortage in the future where general public wants to have 
adequate power to meet their demand. Hence the public interest is to have adequate electricity generation capacity 
to meet the demand. But regulator was unable to achieve that objective and the approval for LCLTGEP was 
delayed. CEB oppose to accept the PUCSL decision on LCLTGEP and implement it. Due to enormous pressure 
from various parties such as CEB trade unions, Political leaders etc. finally, PUCSL approved CEB base case 
scenario with some conditions. That gives evidence for the case that utility can reverse the regulators decision by 
other means. As per the public interest theory regulator should make decisions which are favorable for general 
public hence implementation of the PUCSL decision by the utility is important in the monopoly market. If the 
utility refuses the regulators decision that would be a conflict. In such kind of situation arises, the regulator can 
implement punitive action. Adams et al. (2007) explained the situation with a model as follows. It was depicted by 
Adams et al. (2007) regulatory risk with capture and abuse power as follows. 
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Figure-6.1. Illustration of Regulatory Risk 
                                                     Source: Adams et al. (2007) 
 
This indicates that if the Punitive actions can be taken by the regulator against the utility, command and 
control power is with the regulator, hence there is a high risk of abuse of power by the regulator. If the regulator 
cannot use punitive action, there would be difficulties to implement the decision of regulator through the utility. 
However, in Sri Lankan context command and control of the regulator on utility is very low as there is only one 
utility and trade unions in the utility are also powerful to resist decisions of regulator if those are not favorable for 
them. The one of the reason PUCSL highlighted is that GOSL policy on energy generation is not a clear policy. 
Then GOSL has obtained approval of the Cabinet of ministers for electricity generation mix. This indicates that 
the requirement of the GOSL to resolve the issue amicably. Finally, PUCSL granted approval for CEB proposal. 
PUCSL couldn’t stand their decision further.  
Therefore, that can be depicted as the below figure. This provides additional strength to the utility to resist any 
unfavorable decision of the regulator. 
  
 
Figure-6.2. Illustration of Utilities resistance for regulators decision in the monopolistic Market 
                                      Source: Adams et al. (2007) model developed by Authors 
 
In the context of Sri Lanka, the utility can resist the regulators decision if they see that there is abuse of power 
of regulator, biased towards another stakeholders the decision is not favorable for the interest of the public and or 
shows some elements of regulatory capture. It is something that there is a rigid sphere in the process where 
regulator cannot penetrate to do any abuse or activity leads to the regulatory capture. This can be defined the 
utility stiffness of the resistance. Depend on the level of the strength of the Utility, the level and duration of 
resistance is determined.  However, if the utility resists any decision without good reasoning there should be a way 
to control such action by the regulator. But the issue here is no control by regulator to prevent such situation other 
than through the legal procedure against to the utility, if the utility resists regulators decision without any proper 
ground or evidence of abuse of power. Further in such situations government can interfere to control utilities 
resistance. In the above two cases CEB refused to implement the decisions of PUCSL. In renewable energy tariff 
calculation PUCSL issued an enforcement order, but CEB strongly refused it and they enter to the legal process. 
However, GOSL interfered to the matter and resolve it. But the issue made damages to the renewable energy 
sector especially the new capacity addition hampered. Hence it is clear that utility displayed courage to refuse the 
implementation of PUCSL decision and to reverse it as utility was thinking that the renewable energy tariff was 
prepared by PUCSL considering only the renewable energy developers’ benefits.  
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In the second incident, the CEB did not implement the decision of PUCSL on LCLTGEP. According to the 
PUCSL, they received the comments from some stakeholders. But such stakeholders are keen on removal of Coal 
power generation option where CEB Engineers pressuring to include Coal power plants into the LCLTGEP. On 
the other hand, as per the provisions of the section 43(2) of Sri Lanka Electricity(amendment) Act No. 31 of 2013, 
PUCSL can only get the views from distribution and generation licensees, on proposed LCLTGEP of CEB. 
However most of influential stakeholders who present their case stressed the PUCSL to change the CEB proposal. 
But CEB as the only buyer of the electricity refuses to implement the revised LCLTGEP. Later with the pressure 
from trade unions, political authority etc., PUCSL has granted the approval for LCLTGEP submitted by CEB, 
subjected to some conditions. However general public needs timely implementation of power plants and provide 
uninterrupted electricity service continuously. The implementation of identified projects got delayed which would 
be leading to difficulties in meeting future demand and also compel to go for emergency power purchasing which is 
badly criticized by various stakeholders in different forums. Any way it can be observed that if the utility is strong 
enough to resist the regulators decision in a monopoly market will be led to difficult situation in future for the 
customers in terms of power generation. One of the best option to prevent the regulatory capture is availability of 
information on the regulators decision (PUCSL,2014). With the availability of the information on the basis of the 
decision is not good enough to prevent the regulatory capture. In two cases discussed in this article relevant all the 
information available, but though information available still the utility is highlighting that the based information is 
wrong.    
 
7. Conclusion 
According to Interest Group theory, all the participants in the political process act in their self-interest 
(Elhauge, 1991). As shown above, this notion applies to regulation of the renewable energy tariff determining 
process. The developers who submitted proposals or comments on utilities’ proposal have their own interest to 
increase the tariff so that they earn a higher return. Utility also has its own interest on calculation as they proposed 
the tariff proposal and also they are not sure whether they can receive revenue to meet the increased tariff as the 
customer tariff has not revised adequately to meet the demand. According to the Ministry of Finance and Mass 
media in 2016 and 2017 the CEB suffered revenue gap of LKR Mn. 14,499 and 49,231 respectively (Annual Report, 
2017). Otherwise they have to suffer further with worsen financial position and they will face difficulties with 
future benefits. The Regulator, X, also has some interests as its members’ benefit (Carpenter and Moss, 2013) with 
increased tariff from interest groups.  
However, though the regulator made a decision that can be reversed by the Utility in the monopoly market if 
utility strong enough to do that. If the decision favorable for one particular stakeholder group and not favorable for 
general public and the utility, utility can forcefully reverse the regulators decision which is acceptable if it 
benefitted for general public. But if the decision is favorable for general public if utility forcefully reversed it that 
cannot be accepted. This can be called forceful regulator capture even without influence the regulator, utility can 
reverse the regulators decision either it favorable for general public or not in the monopolistic market. The level of 
the control of the regulator depends on the strength of the utility in the monopoly market. In that context as the 
policy maker, government can play vital role to resolve or control such situation in terms of wellbeing of the 
society. In a monopolistic electricity market, if the utility is strong enough to resist the decisions of the regulator it 
will lead devastation situation in the power sector.  
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